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MASTER'S THESIS

Improving Byzantine Fault Tolerance in Blockchain Networks with Dynamic Clustering

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Abstract

In recent years, blockchain technology, which enables transactions to be distributed across multiple computers and managed in an immutable and secure manner, has garnered significant attention. Within blockchain networks, consensus mechanisms ensure the consistent sharing of ledger information when new blocks are added. In consortium blockchains, typically employed by a limited number of organizations, the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) protocol is widely used. PBFT is designed to tolerate Byzantine nodes—nodes that may be compromised or malfunctioning —by achieving consensus as long as fewer than one-third of the total nodes are Byzantine. However, PBFT relies on the assumption that at least two-thirds of the nodes behave correctly, making consensus challenging when the number of malicious nodes exceeds this threshold. Previous research has explored the use of clustering to enhance throughput, but these methods are static and unsuited to dynamic environments. Moreover, clustering techniques aimed at bolstering Byzantine resistance remain underexplored. This paper presents a novel method for constructing clusters within a blockchain network to resist Byzantine nodes. By employing clustering, we estimate the locations of potential attackers, thereby enhancing the system's resilience to Byzantine faults.

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

Blockchain is a technology that allows for the secure, tamper-resistant sharing and management of transactions across multiple computers using a distributed ledger. There are three primary types of blockchain: permissioned, permissionless, and hybrid. Permissioned blockchains offer high transparency without a central administrator, but their main drawback is that transaction processing and approval times can increase significantly as the number of participants and transaction volume grows. In contrast, permissionless blockchains restrict participation to a single administrator, allowing for faster approval times and limited data disclosure. However, this comes at the expense of decentralization, as authority is concentrated in the hands of the administrator.

The hybrid type falls between the permissioned and permissionless blockchains, with multiple administrators sharing control. While processing times are slower compared to permissionless blockchains, the decentralized distribution of authority makes hybrid blockchains more resistant to data tampering.

Additionally, blockchains use consensus mechanisms where new blocks or transactions are verified by all participants upon creation, allowing for the detection and elimination of potentially falsifiable transactions. Furthermore, Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus mechanisms are also adopted in blockchains like Burrow, Quorum, and Red Belly Blockchain, enhancing their security and performance [1]. In addition to its common use in hybrid blockchains, the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) mechanism [2] is also employed in permissioned blockchains in combination with Proof of Stake. Examples of this include Tendermint [3], used in Cosmos [4], and Tenderbake [5], used in Tezos [6], which have been proposed to implement this mechanism in such contexts.

In PBFT, consensus can be correctly achieved as long as the number of Byzantine nodes is less than one-third of the total number of nodes. Conversely, PBFT requires that more than two-thirds of the nodes are functioning correctly, which complicates the agreement process if the number of attackers exceeds a certain threshold, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Thus, consensus in PBFT is influenced by the presence of Byzantine nodes. This paper proposes a method to enhance resilience against Byzantine attacks by partitioning the topology through clustering, estimating the locations of attackers, and concentrating them within specific clusters [7]. While the proposed method aims to achieve correct consensus, there is a concern that this may lead to increased communication traffic. Therefore, we compare the probability of consensus formation with the amount of communication traffic generated when employing the proposed method.



Figure 1.1: PBFT

The main contributions of this study are as follows:

- In PBFT, which requires more than two-thirds of participants to be normal nodes for consensus to be achieved, the proposed method enables correct consensus even when fewer than two-thirds of the nodes are functioning normally.
- We conduct a theoretical analysis of the upper limit of consensus probability, demonstrating that the simulation results align with the theoretical values.
- We also analyze the upper limit of communication traffic volume theoretically, deriving analytical results that elucidate the relationship between the number of clusters and traffic volume.

In Section 2, we discuss related works, while the proposed method is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 presents the performance evaluation, and we conclude with a summary in Section 5.

Chapter 2

Rerated Work

PBFT [2] consists of a client, replica nodes, and a primary node. Clients generate transactions and send them to the network, while replica nodes represent the nodes within that network. The primary node, designated from among the replica nodes, receives transactions from clients and forwards them to the other replica nodes. To achieve precise agreement, consensus is reached through three phases—pre-prepare, prepare, and commit—following the client's submission of the transaction to the primary node, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

- **pre-prepare phase**:

  The primary node forwards the transaction to the other replica nodes. Each receiving node verifies the validity of the transaction and subsequently broadcasts the verification results to the other nodes.

- **prepare phase**:

  The replica nodes confirm that the verification results match those provided by the primary node and then broadcast their results to the other nodes.

- **commit phase**:

  If a node agrees with the message received during the prepare phase, it sends a commit message to the other nodes.

Finally, when a commit message is received from more than two-thirds of the nodes, a reply message is sent to the client to indicate that consensus has been successfully achieved.

If the primary node fails or behaves maliciously, PBFT initiates a "View Change" process to elect a new primary node. This process involves the following steps:

- Each replica node sends a *view-change* message to all other nodes, indicating that the current primary is no longer trusted.

- Nodes agree on a new primary node based on predefined criteria.

- After agreement, the new primary takes over the responsibilities and resumes the consensus process.

The View Change ensures that the network can recover from primary node failures without compromising safety or liveness.

In PBFT, forks do not occur because it is designed to reach consensus on any given data; however, there are cases where consensus may fail to be achieved.



Figure 2.1: Consensus in PBFT

In [8], the authors present a theoretical analysis of temporal variations in block communication among validator nodes in Ethereum 2. The study models the process of broadcasting a block from the node that generates it to the other nodes, characterizing this process as a Markov process where the probability of each node receiving the block is considered. For a total of N nodes, the resulting communication delay was confirmed to follow $O(N \log N)$.

In [9], the authors propose RC-PBFT (Random Cluster PBFT) and demonstrate its effectiveness, addressing the significant communication overhead inherent in PBFT due to the extensive interactions between nodes. Their approach involves creating clusters through clustering, performing PBFT within randomly selected clusters, and broadcasting the results to other clusters. This method reduces the time required for consensus and enhances throughput compared to conventional PBFT. However, this paper identifies the insufficient optimization of cluster selection as a key issue, and highlights the lack of resilience to Byzantine nodes due to the use of random clustering.

In [10], the authors address the issue of slow transaction verification in Proof-of-Work (PoW) and propose a method to reduce the verification time by utilizing parallel mining both within and between clusters.

As shown in Figure 2.2, the network comprises mining nodes that perform mining and full nodes that distribute blocks to other clusters. Mining begins simultaneously across all clusters, and the mining node that discovers a block sends it to the full node, which then forwards it to the mining nodes within its own cluster as well as to other full nodes. All full nodes that receive the block



Figure 2.2: Parallel Mining

broadcast it to their respective mining nodes for verification. The experimental results indicate that this approach reduces consensus time and enhances the scalability of the network. However, this paper does not present specific evaluations or simulation results regarding how clustering-based topology improvements contribute to network security. In particular, it appears to lack a detailed analysis of resilience against varying numbers of adversaries.

In [11], the authors express concern that while a distributed network structure is anticipated to enhance scalability and eliminate single points of failure in networks comprising multiple robots, PBFT requires extensive communication to achieve consensus. To address this, they propose a method that groups robot nodes into clusters using the k-means algorithm, aiming to reduce consensus delays and energy consumption between groups. Additionally, the behavior of nodes in each cluster during the consensus process is monitored and scored, with the node having the highest score randomly selected as the primary node to enhance the reliability of the primary node.

In [12], a novel consensus algorithm (NBFT) is proposed to achieve high fault tolerance and decentralization, while improving communication complexity and scalability. This study reduces communication complexity through a hash algorithm and ensures the safety of consensus within groups by introducing a threshold voting model. However, the focus is primarily on reducing traffic, with limited consideration given to the potential impacts of attackers.

In [13], the authors provide a systematic and comprehensive review of blockchain sharding techniques, identifying the key elements and challenges associated with sharding. Sharding is a technique that divides nodes into multiple groups (shards) to enhance the scalability of a blockchain network, enabling each shard to process transactions independently and thereby increasing the overall processing capacity. This study analyzes in detail the essential components of sharding implementation and the challenges that may arise.However, this paper highlights that in the presence of an unexpectedly large number of Byzantine nodes, there is a potential risk of data block tampering. Although the proposed scheme shows promise in enhancing data integrity, it does not offer a complete resolution to the issue.

In [14], the study employs network coding, a technique for efficient data transmission, in PBFT. The proposed method aims to enhance scalability by reducing the maximum bandwidth requirement, demonstrating improved communication efficiency and scalability compared to conventional methods.

In [15], a solution is presented for enhancing the scalability of blockchains through a three-layer architecture. This approach aims to increase overall efficiency by utilizing sharding and distributing processing tasks across different layers. Meanwhile, [16] categorizes existing sharding schemes based on blockchain type and sharding technology, analyzing their respective advantages and disadvantages. The study also establishes criteria for the applicability of various sharding techniques.

Chapter 3

Proposed Method

3.1 Overview

In this paper, we propose two methods, referred to as Proposed Method I and Proposed Method II, respectively. Proposed Method II is designed to reduce the traffic volume associated with Proposed Method I.

3.1.1 Proposed Method I

Following is the flow of the Proposed Method I, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.

1. Conduct PBFT across the entire network.
2. If consensus cannot be reached, apply the k-means method to partition the network.
3. Conduct PBFT within each cluster.
4. Perform PBFT between clusters based on the results obtained within each cluster.
5. If consensus is not achieved, it is determined that there are many attackers in the cluster that sent the minority opinion, leading to the merging of the minority clusters. After merging, return to step 3.
6. If consensus is successfully formed, the process is terminated.

After executing the k-means method, PBFT is performed within clusters and between clusters, as indicated in steps 3 and 4. This process includes the pre-prepare phase, prepare phase, and commit phase, which is why Figure 3.1 states ”run each of these three times.” Furthermore, as indicated in step 5, if consensus cannot be reached even after clustering, clusters are merged each time, which is noted as ”run every merge.”

Thus, the Proposed Method I can estimate clusters with a high concentration of attackers through clustering and merge them to reduce the overall proportion of attacker clusters. Consequently, the percentage of consensus reached also increases. Additionally, the clustering using the k-means method



Figure 3.1: Proposed Method I

and the merging process must be executed autonomously by the nodes, with results shared among them. Therefore, there is a phase dedicated to broadcasting geographical and other relevant information.

The specific flow is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The circles represent the nodes in the blockchain network. In this figure, 7 out of 20 nodes are Byzantine nodes. Since Byzantine nodes comprise more than one-third of the total, it is impossible to achieve consensus even if PBFT is executed in this scenario. Consequently, clustering is performed, resulting in one cluster containing more than one-third of Byzantine nodes, as indicated by the red dotted line. In this case, when PBFT is conducted within each cluster and between clusters, consensus is reached in four out of the five clusters, indicating that consensus can be correctly formed.

On the other hand, as shown in the left part of Figure 3.3, even when clustering is performed, consensus may not be achievable if two clusters contain the majority of Byzantine nodes, resulting in a situation where more than one-third cannot reach agreement. However, by merging the minority clusters (indicated by the red dotted line), three normal clusters can be formed out of the four clusters, allowing for successful consensus formation.

In the proposed method, during the merging process, clusters with a smaller average number of nodes are combined until the minimum required number of clusters for PBFT, which is four, is achieved. Table 3.1 illustrates an example of how the number of nodes within clusters changes, with the average number of nodes per cluster denoted as n and the initial number of clusters represented by m.



Figure 3.2: Clustering



Figure 3.3: Merging Clusters

No. of Merges	No. of Nodes in Each Cluster	No. of Clusters
0	$n, n, \ldots, n, n$	m
1	$2n, \ldots, n, n$	$m-1$
2	$2n, \ldots, 2n$	$m-2$
...	...	...

Table 3.1: Number of Nodes within Clusters

3.1.2 Proposed Method II

Following is the flow of the Proposed Method II, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.

1. Apply the k-means method to partition the network.
2. Conduct PBFT within each cluster.
3. Perform PBFT between clusters based on the results obtained within each cluster.
4. If consensus is not achieved, it is determined that there are many attackers in the cluster that sent the minority opinion, leading to all minority clusters being merged at once.
5. If consensus is successfully formed, the process is terminated.

Proposed Method II mainly differs from Proposed Method I in the following aspects.

- The overall PBFT is not executed initially.
- Instead of merging minority clusters after each inter-cluster PBFT, multiple minority clusters are merged simultaneously (Therefore, unlike Figure 3.1, Figure 3.4 does not include the note "run every merge" during the merge execution phase).

Since the overall PBFT is not executed initially, there is a concern that correct consensus may not be reached even if the number of attackers is low, or that unnecessary clustering may occur. On the other hand, by not performing the initial PBFT and merging multiple minority clusters at once, as shown in Figure 3.5, a reduction in communication traffic is expected.

3.1.3 Liveness and Security

PBFT ensures both liveness and safety even when up to $\lfloor (n-1)/3 \rfloor$ replicas out of a total of n replicas are simultaneously faulty. Liveness guarantees that the system can make progress despite leader failures or the presence of malicious nodes, while safety ensures that the system does not produce incorrect or inconsistent results. Similarly, in the proposed method, liveness is maintained by enabling a view change when the leader node becomes a Byzantine faulty node. Furthermore, when



Figure 3.4: Proposed Method II



Figure 3.5: Merging Clusters in Proposed Method II

multiple clusters perform a view change simultaneously, it may be necessary for clusters to verify that the view change has been completed across all clusters. Without such verification, there is a risk that some clusters might attempt to reach consensus before the view change process has been finalized in others, leading to potential inconsistencies. Therefore, it would be beneficial to include a mechanism to check and confirm that all clusters have completed the view change and returned to a stable state, ensuring that consensus formation between clusters can proceed only after the view change has been securely completed. Additionally, as demonstrated in Section 4.2, safety is preserved by reducing the influence of Byzantine nodes compared to the existing PBFT, even when the proportion of Byzantine nodes exceeds one-third.

3.2 Performance Limit

In this section, we present a theoretical analysis of the probability of consensus formation and the upper bounds on communication traffic when the proposed method is applied.

variable name	**meaning**
N	Total number of nodes
m	Number of clusters
n	Number of nodes in cluster
f	Number of Byzantine nodes

Table 3.2: Variable

3.2.1 Probability of Consensus Formation

We analyze the performance limits of the probability of consensus formation. Assuming equal divisions, we use the variables defined in Table 3.2 to represent the total number of nodes as follows:

$$N = mn \tag{3.1}$$

The upper bound on the number of Byzantine nodes in a normal PBFT is given by:

$$N = mn = 3f + 1 \tag{3.2}$$

Therefore,

$$f = \frac{mn - 1}{3} \tag{3.3}$$

Also, the upper bound on the number of Byzantine nodes f^m in an m-equally divided two-stage PBFT is as follows:

1. From $m = 3f' + 1$, all nodes can be Byzantine nodes in f' clusters. Hence,

$$f' = \frac{m - 1}{3} \tag{3.4}$$

2. For the remaining $(2f' + 1)$ clusters, from $n = 3f'' + 1$,

$$f'' = \frac{n - 1}{3} \tag{3.5}$$

   nodes can be Byzantine nodes.

Therefore, from equations (3.4) and (3.5), we have:

$$\begin{aligned} f^m &= f' \cdot n + (2f' + 1) \cdot f'' \\ &= \frac{mn - 1}{3} + \frac{2}{9}(m - 1)(n - 1) \\ &= f + \frac{2}{9}(m - 1)(n - 1). \end{aligned} \tag{3.6}$$

This means that the proposed method increases the upper limit of Byzantine nodes by $\frac{2}{9}(m-1)(n-1)$ compared to the conventional method.

Given that it increases by $m \approx n$,

$$\frac{f^m}{N} = \frac{5}{9} - \frac{4}{9} \cdot \frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{9} \cdot \frac{1}{n^2} \tag{3.7}$$

As $N \to \infty$,

$$\frac{f^m}{N} \to \frac{5}{9} \tag{3.8}$$

Consequently, from equation (3.8), if the number of Byzantine nodes is less than $\frac{5}{9}$ of the total number of nodes, the proposed method may be used to reach a consensus.

3.2.2 Amount of Communication Traffic

We also calculate the communication complexity based on [17] for communication traffic. Using the variables in Table 3.2, the amount of traffic associated with location information sharing using the k-means method and consensus building using PBFT is as follows:

$$N \log N + 3(m \log m + n \log n) \tag{3.9}$$

When the merge is performed once, the number of clusters is $m - 1$, with the number of nodes in one cluster being $2n$ and n for the remaining $m - 2$ clusters. In this case, the traffic generated will be:

$$3\left\{(2n)\log(2n) + (m-1)\log(m-1)\right\} \tag{3.10}$$

When the number of merges is $\frac{m}{2}$ times, the number of clusters is $\frac{m}{2}$, and the number of nodes in each cluster is all $2n$. Therefore, the amount of communication at this time is:

$$3\left\{(2n)\log(2n) + \frac{m}{2}\log\frac{m}{2}\right\} \tag{3.11}$$

Therefore, from equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11),

$$\begin{aligned} &N \log N + 3(m \log m + n \log n) + 3 \cdot \frac{m}{2} \cdot 2n \log 2n + \sum_{i=\frac{m}{2}}^{m-1} i \log i \\ &= nm \log nm + 3n \log n + 3nm \log 2n + \sum_{i=\frac{m}{2}}^{m-1} i \log i \end{aligned} \tag{3.12}$$

Here, in (3.12),

$$\sum_{i=\frac{m}{2}}^{m-1} i \log i \simeq \int_{\frac{m}{2}}^{m} x \log x \, dx$$
$$= O(m^2 \log m) \tag{3.13}$$

Therefore, from (3.13), as m increases, the upper limit of the communication volume increases by $m^2 \log m$.

Chapter 4

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method through computer simulations. Based on the following evaluation conditions, we compare the proportion of consensus achieved and the amount of communication traffic generated. For the probability of consensus, we count the number of times consensus is reached out of 100 executions.

4.1 Evaluation Conditions

Under the conditions outlined in Table 4.1, we compare the proposed method (Proposed Method $k = 7, 10, 15$) with conventional PBFT (Existing PBFT) and PBFT with the k-means method applied only once (Existing Method $k = 7, 10, 15$).

4.2 Consensus Probability

4.2.1 Proposed Method I

Figure 4.1 illustrates the probability of reaching consensus in Proposed Method I for the BA, ER, and WS models as the number of attackers varies from 0 to 90. In all models, the proposed method successfully achieved consensus even when the number of attackers exceeded one-third of the total number of nodes. It is evident that the consensus probability was higher in the proposed method compared to the conventional method. This improvement can be attributed to the aggregation of clusters with a high number of attackers, which increased the proportion of clusters that produced correct results. Furthermore, correct consensus was still attainable even with up to approximately 50 attackers, representing more than 5/9 of the total participants. This outcome aligns with the performance limits derived from the theoretical analysis, confirming that the theoretical values are consistent with the simulation results. However, it is noteworthy that when the number of clusters is small (i.e., $k = 7$), the performance limit is exceeded. This discrepancy arises because the theoretical values derived in Section 3.2.1 are based on a single instance of clustering, while the simulations involve multiple rounds of clustering and merging, leading to surpassing the expected performance limits.



Figure 4.1: Consensus Probability in Proposed Method I

Item	Condition
Number of nodes	90
Number of Byzantine nodes	0~90
Clustering method	k-means
Number of clusters	7, 10, 15
Network topology	Barabasi-Albert (BA) Erdos-Renyi (ER) Watts-Strogatz (WS)

Table 4.1: Simulation Conditions

4.2.2 Proposed Method II

Figure 4.2 illustrates the probability of reaching consensus in Proposed Method II for the BA, ER, and WS models as the number of attackers varies from 0 to 90. As with Proposed Method I, it is possible to achieve correct consensus even when attackers comprise up to 5/9 of the total participants. However, there are instances where consensus is not reached when the number of attackers is between 25 and 30 (i.e., less than one-third of the total). This is due to the initial clustering results, where clusters with a majority of attackers can represent more than half of the overall clusters. Nonetheless, the likelihood of such a scenario occurring is low, so it is not expected to impact performance.

4.3 Amount of Traffic

4.3.1 Proposed Method I

Figure 4.3 presents the amount of communication traffic in Proposed Method I. In the proposed method, the traffic volume increased compared to the conventional method due to the additional traffic generated by PBFT after clustering and the necessity to broadcast data among nodes for executing the k-means method. Moreover, when the number of attackers exceeded one-third of the total nodes, the traffic volume surged significantly because of clustering, merging, and PBFT traffic within and between clusters. Furthermore, as the number of clusters increased, the frequency of merging also increased if consensus was not reached, leading to a further rise in traffic volume as the number of attackers escalated.

4.3.2 Proposed Method II

Figure 4.4 presents the amount of communication traffic in Proposed Method II. Compared to Figure 4.3, traffic volume is reduced when the number of attackers exceeds 30. This is because the frequency of merging and PBFT executions has decreased compared to Proposed Method I. However, the traffic volume remains higher than that of conventional PBFT due to factors like the sharing of initial clustering results. Therefore, there is a trade-off relationship between the probability of reaching consensus and the traffic volume.



Figure 4.2: Consensus Probability in Proposed Method II



Figure 4.3: Amount of Traffic in Proposed Method I



Figure 4.4: Amount of Traffic in Proposed Method II

4.3.3 Traffic Volume against the Number of Clusters



Figure 4.5: Traffic Volume against the Number of Clusters

Figure 4.5 illustrates the amount of traffic for the BA, ER, and WS models, with the number of nodes and attackers set to 90 and 40, respectively. The theoretical value $O(m^2 \log m)$ for the traffic volume, derived in Section 3.2, is also plotted for comparison. To observe the trends between the simulation results and theoretical values, we added a constant to the theoretical values. Notably, the lines for the BA and ER models overlap in the graph. Furthermore, the jagged nature of the curves can be attributed to situations where, in cases of an even number of clusters, the number of supporting clusters may equal the number of opposing ones. This can lead to instances where consensus is not achieved, resulting in a lower probability of consensus formation compared to cases with an odd number of clusters.

In all models, the amount of traffic increased with the number of clusters. Additionally, the observed increase in traffic volume aligned closely with the theoretical value, confirming the robustness of the theoretical analysis presented in Section 3.2. Since the theoretical values serve as approximations in terms of order of magnitude, the trends observed in both the theoretical and simulation results were found to be consistent.

Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the upper limits of consensus formation and communication

Algorithm	Fault-tolerant limit	Communication complexity
PBFT [2]	1/3	$O(n^2)$
NBFT [12]	approx. 1/3	$O([(n-1)/m]^2)$
Hotstuff [18]	1/3	$O(n)$
Proposed Method	max. 5/9	$O(m^2 \log m)$

Table 4.2: Comparison with Other Algorithms

complexity between the proposed method and conventional methods. While the upper limit of consensus formation for conventional methods is approximately 1/3, the proposed method achieves a significant improvement, reaching 5/9. On the other hand, the communication complexity of the proposed method is the highest, as confirmed by performance evaluation results showing that it generates the largest amount of communication traffic.

As demonstrated so far, the proposed method consumes a significant amount of traffic. Therefore, it is necessary to devise a method to mitigate this traffic consumption. Specifically, by leveraging HotStuff [18], which achieves a communication complexity of $O(N)$, we anticipate that the traffic volume of the proposed method can be significantly reduced. Furthermore, the latest HotStuff-1 [19] reduces the number of phases required compared to the previous HotStuff-2 [20], which is also expected to improve latency.

Future research should also explore the application of consensus mechanisms in sharding. This investigation is crucial for enhancing the scalability and efficiency of blockchain systems. In particular, the theoretical analysis presented by on block time distributions in Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus blockchains is highly relevant. By applying these insights to sharded architectures, we can develop more efficient and secure consensus protocols that maintain the integrity and performance of the blockchain as it scales.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a method to enhance resistance against Byzantine attacks by utilizing clustering and merging techniques. We compared the percentage of consensus formation and the amount of communication traffic between the proposed method and conventional approaches. Through simulation evaluations, we confirmed the following key findings:

- By applying the proposed method, it became possible to reach correct consensus even when more than one-third of the participants were attackers.
- The proposed method enabled correct consensus to be reached even with up to 5/9 of the participants being attackers, which aligns with the performance limit of consensus probability derived through theoretical analysis.
- The amount of traffic increased considerably compared to conventional methods due to the rise in the number of communications and the volume of data exchanged. Additionally, as the number of attackers increased, the interactions with other clusters also escalated, leading to higher traffic.
- As the number of clusters increased, the traffic volume also grew. We derived the theoretical upper limit of the communication overhead generated by the proposed method, and by comparing it to the simulation results—after adding a constant—we confirmed that both exhibit a similar increasing trend.

In the future, we plan to devise a method to reduce the amount of traffic while maintaining the probability of consensus.

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